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The Effectiveness of Risk Disclosure Practices in the 
European Insurance Industry 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper examines whether risk disclosure practices affect stock return volatility and 
company value in the European insurance industry. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using a self-constructed “Risk Disclosure Index for Insurers” (RDII) 
to measure the extent of information disclosed on risks and employing panel data regression on a sample 
of European insurers for 2005–2010, it tests: i) the relationship between RDII and stock return volatility; 
ii) whether this relationship is affected by financial crisis; iii) whether RDII affects insurance companies’ 
embedded value. 
Findings – The main results indicate that higher RDII contributes to higher volatility, suggesting that 
“less is more” rather than “more is good”. However, higher RDII leads to lower volatility when the 
insurer has a positive net income, thus “more is good when all is good” and “less is good when all is bad”. 
Furthermore, the relationship between RDII and stock return volatility is not affected by financial crisis, 
raising concerns regarding the effectiveness of insurers’ risk disclosure to reassure the market. Moreover, 
higher RDII is found to impact positively on embedded value, thus contributing towards higher firm value.  
Practical implications – The findings could drive insurers’ choices on communication and transparency, 
alongside regulators’ decisions about market discipline. They also suggest that risk disclosure could be 
used to strengthen market discipline and should be added to the other variables traditionally used in stock 
return volatility and firm value estimation models in the insurance industry. 
Originality/value – This paper offers new insights in the debate on the bright and dark sides of risk 
disclosure in the insurance industry and provides interesting implications for insurers and their 
stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, several factors, including the global financial crisis, firms’ need for capital, and market 
pressure, have led to an increased need for transparency and communication in the financial system. New 
and updated regulations have stressed this point, too, by introducing disclosure requirements (i.e., Basel 
III, MiFID II, and Solvency II). From this point of view, it is fundamental to investigate the impact of 
disclosure, as its effects could influence companies’ ex ante choices on when, how, and what to 
communicate, as well as policymakers’ initiatives on market discipline. This has important implications 
for stakeholders and c mpanies themselves, thus raising the need to further investigate this phenomenon 
by testing whether a change in the extent of disclosure could be beneficial or counterproductive. 
The existing literature is marred with controversial and contrasting results. On the one hand, studies 
indicate disclosure to be beneficial as it reduces uncertainty, information asymmetry, the impact of news 
about firms’ performance, and, hence, volatility, with a subsequent reduction in the cost of capital 
(Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Ntim et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
providing information is costly, it is subject to exploitation by competitors, and the quantity could be 
insufficient if it is not readable and comprehensive, especially for a complex business (Chen and Hasan, 
2006; Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 2011; Bratten et al., 2015). However, no empirical evidence is found on 
the effectiveness of risk disclosure practices for insurance companies. 
Investigating risk disclosure practices and their effectiveness is particularly relevant in the insurance 
sector due to its unique characteristics with respect to other business sectors (i.e., banking and non-
financial sectors): insurance companies are typically characterized by the reversal of the production cycle, 
the law of large numbers, the importance of investment activity, and, most importantly, the core business 
of an insurance company is providing protection to policyholders from identified risks. In this context, 
risk management assumes a crucial role in the insurance sector, and risk disclosure, in particular, is 
crucial for policyholders, regulators, and other external stakeholders interested in understanding how risks 
are faced and managed. 
This research fills this gap in the existing literature by presenting empirical evidence on whether risk 
disclosure provided by European insurance companies over the period 2005–2010 impacted on financial 
markets and company value. First, it tests whether insurers that disclose more have lower stock return 
volatility than insurers that disclose less; thus, it tries to answer the following research question: Does risk 
disclosure by European insurers affect their stock return volatility? Moreover, it also investigates if the 
effectiveness of disclosure practices has increased or been hampered due to the financial crisis, 
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addressing the second research question: Did the financial crisis affect the relationship between risk 
disclosure practices and stock return volatility? Finally, it provides new empirical evidence on the impact 
of risk disclosure on company value, as measured by the insurers’ embedded value, answering the third 
research question: Does risk disclosure by European insurers affect company value? 
The main results show that risk disclosure is a significant predictor of stock return volatility, in the 
sense that higher risk disclosure contributes to higher volatility, suggesting that “less is more” rather than 
“more is good”. However, the relationship becomes negative when the insurer has a positive net income, 
thus indicating that “more is good when all is good” and that “less is good when all is bad”. However, the 
relationship between risk disclosure and stock return volatility is not significantly affected by financial 
crisis, indicating that “when the waters are stormy”, insurers do not use risk disclosure effectively to 
reassure their stakeholders, or perhaps the information content provided fails to reassure the market. 
Moreover, risk disclosure has a positive impact on the company’s value, thus increasing the value as 
perceived by shareholders. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the effectiveness of risk disclosure practices for 
financial markets, insurance companies, and their stakeholders in the following ways. First, risk 
information disclosed by insurers on a voluntary basis amplifies market uncertainty, in line with previous 
literature that provides evidence on the dark side of disclosure. However, the impact of disclosure 
changes for companies that report a positive net income. As such, companies define their disclosure 
strategies depending on their performance; in doing so, “more is good when all is good” while, 
conversely, “less is good when all is bad”. Its second contribution is the finding that, during the crisis, 
insurance companies did not use disclosure effectively to reduce uncertainty, as such the relationship 
between risk disclosure and volatility remains unchanged when controlling for the crisis. Finally, the third 
contribution is related to the impact of disclosure on company value. The evidence suggests that risk 
disclosure improves insurance companies’ embedded value. 
The results from this study provide interesting implications for insurers and their stakeholders; in 
particular, they could drive companies’ choices on communication and transparency, as well as 
regulators’ decisions about market discipline. These findings also suggest that risk disclosure could be 
used to strengthen market discipline, and should be added to other variables traditionally used in stock 
return volatility and firm value estimation models in the insurance industry. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and 
identifies the research hypotheses. Section 3 defines the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Bright and dark side of disclosure 
The amount of information companies disclose in the public domain is an important issue widely debated 
in the literature, due to its consequences on companies, their stakeholders, and the financial system as a 
whole. The amount of information disclosed by companies in their annual reports is usually measured in 
the existing literature through the construction of a disclosure index. This requires identifying a set of 
relevant information, testing its presence in the disclosure tools identified, and assigning a score based on 
the amount of information provided (Botosan, 1997; Ho and Wong, 2003; Baumann and Nier, 2004; 
Perignon and Smith, 2010; Höring and Gründl, 2011; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Malafronte et al., 2016). 
Part of the literature focuses on specific items, such as risk disclosure practices, based on the 
consideration that investors need to understand the risks a company takes and desire information on the 
sustainability of value creation strategies (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005; Starita and Malafronte, 2014). While it is important to implement risk management 
systems, it is equally important to communicate effectively on the risks faced and the plans to seize 
opportunities and minimize the risk of failure (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
Previous research discusses both the bright and dark side of disclosure, finding contrasting results. 
Some studies show that companies could benefit from a higher level of disclosure, in terms of lower 
information asymmetry, access to critical resources, social acceptance, and approval by stakeholders 
(Ntim et al., 2013). In addition, a high level of disclosure could reduce the heterogeneity of beliefs on 
firm value, improve corporate reputation, and reduce the cost of equity, cost of debt, risk, and price 
volatility (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; 
Baumann and Nier, 2004; Francis et al., 2008). However, other studies find disclosure to have damaging 
consequences. Disclosure is costly, both in terms of the direct costs of producing and disseminating 
information and the indirect costs when competitors are able to exploit the information provided 
(Baumann and Nier, 2004).  
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2.2 Disclosure and stock return volatility 
A stream of literature investigates the relationship between disclosure practices and stock return volatility. 
There are several reasons why an increase in disclosure could affect stock return volatility. On the one 
hand, disclosure could mitigate uncertainty, reducing the magnitude of the impact of news about a firm’s 
performance, thus reducing information asymmetry in the market and the heterogeneity of beliefs about 
the true value of the firm. On the other hand, an increase in disclosure implies that more information is 
released thus providing the markets with more data that might be misconstrued by analysts and market 
participants, leading t  higher volatility (Baumann and Nier, 2004). Favorable disclosure leads to a 
decline in the cost of capital, stock return volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion, while unfavorable 
disclosure increases risk measures (Kothari et al., 2009). Moreover, theories from information economics 
link the informativeness of public information to informed trading (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; 
Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). These 
theories state an inverse relationship between the informativeness of public information and the 
incentives to acquire private information or exploit the existing ones; moreover, these theories predict that 
the level of informed trading, as the informational advantage of informed traders, is inversely related to 
the informativeness of public disclosure (Jayaraman, 2008). Although financial markets tend to prefer 
smooth earnings (Graham et al., 2005), the relationship between informed trading and earnings volatility 
depends on how the reporting is able to provide or garble information (Jayaraman, 2008). 
Despite the importance of disclosure in the financial industry, evidence on the impact of disclosure by 
financial institutions is limited. The lack of studies can be attributed to the complexity of the information 
disclosed, which is strictly related to the risk management activity. Beaver et al. (1989) find that 
supplemental disclosure provided by banks with respect to default risk (non-performing loan data) and 
interest-rate risk (loan maturity data) explains variation in the market-to-book value of banks' common 
equity. Bushee and Noe (2000) also find that an increase in firm disclosure practices, as measured by the 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), positively affects the level of 
institutional investor ownership and, hence, reduces stock return volatility. Moreover, Baumann and Nier 
(2004) show that banks that provide more information on key items of disclosure have lower stock 
volatility than banks that disclose less information; consequently, disclosure may be useful to investors, 
banks, and supervisors. 
Surprisingly, there is no evidence on the impact of disclosure practices in the insurance industry. 
Insurance companies are typically devoted to relevant risk management activities, and there is growing 
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need for financial markets and other stakeholders to analyze how risk information is disclosed and risk 
management activities are communicated. Most insurance activities are under supervisory control; 
however, some aspects of risk management activity, e.g., underwriting risk management, can be disclosed 
to financial markets and other stakeholders in a manner different from that mandated by the applicable 
accounting standards. This study fits into the emerging field of literature investigating the effectiveness of 
disclosure practices for insurance companies; in particular, it investigates the impact of risk disclosure on 
stock return volatility. In line with previous literature and relying on theories from information 
economics, the first research hypothesis tests the relationship between risk disclosure and stock return 
volatility, i.e., the availability of public information and financial markets’ sensitivity to companies’ 
communication: 
H1: Risk disclosure and stock return volatility are significantly related. 
Moreover, the literature on corporate communication emphasizes the importance of open and proactive 
crisis communication (Claeys et al., 2016). Indeed, in turbulent economic conditions firms must improve 
their corporate communication to meet the information requirements of capital markets (Satta et al., 
2015). However, there is no empirical evidence on the effectiveness of disclosure practices during the 
financial crisis. The second research hypothesis tests whether and how companies’ disclosure practices 
change during financial crisis and if markets become particularly sensitive during periods of financial 
turmoil: 
H2: Financial crisis moderates the relationship between risk disclosure practices and stock return 
volatility. 
 
2.3 Disclosure and company value 
Company value is measured using a wide spectrum of models, ranging from simple to sophisticated, and 
from general to sector specific (Damodaran, 2007). Within the insurance sector, company value is 
estimated using embedded value, a special version of the discounted cash flow model, offering an 
actuarial estimate of the present value of the future net cash flows arising from the company’s life 
insurance business. Embedded value is used by analysts, preferred over traditional accounting measures 
for valuation of insurance businesses, and represents a robust measure of firm value (El-Gazzar et al., 
2013).  
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The CFO Forum defines the embedded value of an insurance company as the consolidated value of the 
shareholders’ interests in the company: embedded value corresponds to the present value of all future 
shareholders’ cash flows from the covered in-force business, capital, and surplus, taking into account a 
realistic hypothesis on the macroeconomic indicators (e.g., the correct inflation rate) (CFO, 2009). Apart 
from practitioner-oriented studies on insurance companies (America Academy of Actuaries, 2009; 
Deloitte, 2014), the effect of disclosure on firm value has been largely neglected in academic literature. 
Considering that higher disclosure has a positive effect on firm performance (Bazrafshan et al., 2016), it 
can be expected to have a similar effect on insurers’ embedded value, through a positive effect on 
expected cash flows. 
There are several reasons why an insurance company would adopt a set of consistent disclosure 
practices to influence its firm value. The greater the amount of information disclosed, the easier it is to 
measure the future cash flows of the insurance business and the risks associated therewith. Additionally, 
more information is essential to correctly understand the characteristics of the insurance business (i.e., the 
production cycle, the nature of insurers’ debts, etc.).  
Despite the importance of this evidence from a policy perspective, the fundamental assumptions about 
disclosure and its effects on the insurance industry have remained largely unexplored. Within this context, 
it is interesting to investigate how risk disclosure impacts on insurers’ value. It is expected that an 
insurer’s disclosure practices positively affect its firm value; thus, the third research hypothesis is: 
H3: Risk disclosure positively affects insurers’ embedded value. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and data 
The sample comprises 47 insurance companies operating across Europe and representing more than 50% 
of the European insurance industry in terms of premiums collected, based on CEA statistics (CEA, 2011). 
The insurance sector is more concentrated than other sectors of the European financial system (ECB, 
2007) and represents an ideal setting to test the effectiveness of disclosure practices, as European 
insurance supervisors promote the same risk management standards across the insurance sector (EIOPA, 
2013). 
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Data are collected from two main sources: companies’ annual reports and the Bloomberg database, for 
the period 2005 to 2010. The period of analysis represents a sufficient time span to test the impact of 
disclosure and the joint effect of disclosure and financial crisis. 
Insurers’ disclosure practices are measured using a risk disclosure index for insurers built following 
the best practices suggested by the literature (Höring and Gründl, 2011; Malafronte et al., 2016).  
Tables Ia and Ib report definition, source and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
 
[Table Ia and Table Ib about here] 
 
3.2 The risk disclosure index 
The risk disclosure index for insurers (hereinafter RDII) measures the amount of risk information 
insurance companies provide in the risk management section of their annual reports. It is composed of 30 
items organized into seven main categories: risk management, underwriting risk, market risk, credit risk, 
operational risk, liquidity risk, and other risks: 
																																																							, = ∑ 


  (1) 
where i represents the insurance company, t is the year to which the annual report refers, and m indicates 
each item included in the index. The final score is obtained by assigning a score (0, 1, or 2) to a 
predefined list of items referring to the above seven categories. This index focuses on information related 
to risk management, which is a crucial activity for financial intermediaries as risk-taking enterprises; thus, 
it is expected to disclose risk-related information. The items were selected from disclosure index 
literature (Botosan, 1997; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Höring and Gründl, 2011; Malafronte et al., 2016) 
and take into account the peculiarities of the insurance business, while focusing on information disclosed 
on voluntarily basis rather than those mandatory. See Appendix for details. 
 
3.3 Risk disclosure and stock return volatility 
Eq.2 provides estimate on the effectiveness of risk disclosure practices on stock return volatility, in order 
to test the first research hypothesis (H1) and answer the first research question. A random effect panel 
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data
a
 regression is estimated, that measures the impact of the risk disclosure index for insurers (RDII) on 
stock return volatility (VOLATILITY): 
, =  + , + ∑  , + !,
"
                                                                  (2) 
where i represents the insurance company, t is each year over the period investigated (2005-2010) and 
j identifies the control variables. VOLATILITY is the annualized standard deviation of an insurer’s daily 
equity returns, RDII is the measure of risk disclosure. CONTROL identifies a vector of control variables, 
including MARKETCAP, BETA, ROE, DIVIDEND_RATIO, EARNINGS_PERSHARE.  
To improve the robustness of the estimation, a further random effect regression (Eq.3) introduces a set 
of variables (i.e., SECTOR) that is strictly related to the characteristics of the insurance business, 
including PREMIUM_GROWTH, LEVERAGE, TYPE_INSURANCE: 
, =  + , + ∑  , + ∑ #$
%, +
"
$ !,
"
                               (3) 
where i represents the insurance company, t is each year of the period investigated (2005-2010), j 
identifies the control variables capturing company performance, and k identifies control variables 
representing insurer-level characteristics. 
In order to test the second research hypothesis (H2) and answer the second research question, a dummy 
variable capturing financial crisis years (D_CRISIS) is introduced along with an interaction term 
(RDII*D_CRISIS) to test the effectiveness of risk disclosure practices on stock retunr volatility during 
financial crisis: 
, =
 + , + &_

 + (_

 ∗ , 	+ ∑  , + ∑ #$
%, +
"
$ !, 		
"
                                                                  
(4) 
where i represents the insurance company, t is each year of the period investigated, j identifies the 
control variables capturing company performance, and k identifies insurer-level characteristics.  
As robustness check and to counter endogeneity issues, the analysis is replicated using the dependent 
variable at time t+1 as in Baumann and Nier (2004). This also allows taking into account the time when 
the annual reports were released as they become public in the year following the one to which their 
                                                             
a
 The choice of using random effects over fixed effects is based on theoretical motivations. Indeed, random effects regressions 
control for the cross-sectional differences as well as the country differences between insurers in the sample. In the context of 
this study, random effect assumes that differences across entities have some influence on the dependent variables and allows 
including time invariant variables (i.e., type insurance). 
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contents refer to (after closing and approving the financial statements). See Tables Ia and Ib for variable 
description. 
 
3.4 Risk disclosure and company value 
To test the third research hypothesis (H3) and answer the third research question, Eq.5 estimates the 
impact of risk disclosure on insurance companies’ value, as measured by EMBEDDED_VALUE: 
%*+%%_,%, =  + , + ∑  , + ∑ #$
%, +
"
$ !,
"
  (5) 
where i represents the insurance company, t is each year of the period investigated, j identifies the control 
variables capturing company performance, and k identifies insurer-level characteristics. 
The variable descriptions are set out in Tables Ia and Ib. Table II reports the correlation matrix among 
the regressors included in all the regression models, evidencing no multicollinearity issues. 
[Table II about here] 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Risk disclosure and stock return volatility 
The main purpose of this study is to test if risk disclosure drives stock return volatility in the insurance 
industry. Following the consolidated literature in this field, this research postulates that stock return 
volatility is affected by changes in a firm’s activity (i.e., idiosyncratic risk), as well as by changes in 
market conditions (i.e., systematic risk) (see, for example, Cao and Han, 2016). Further, it hypothesizes 
that an insurer’s stock return volatility is driven by the information disclosed on the typical risks faced by 
the insurance business, in addition to the control variables.  
Table III provides empirical evidence for the first research hypothesis (H1). In all the model 
specifications in Table III, RDII is found to have a significant impact on stock return volatility. More 
specifically, the positive coefficient indicates that an increase in RDII leads to higher stock return 
volatility. Disclosing more risk information increases the magnitude of the impact of news about the 
insurer’s performance, in line with the literature that emphasizes the dark side effects of voluntary 
disclosure. In contrast to the literature documenting a negative relationship between disclosure and 
volatility (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Baumann and Nier, 2004), this result shows that providing more 
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information on risk disclosure practices impacts on the equity market in terms of increased stock return 
volatility. This seems to suggest that “less is more” rather than “more is good” when presenting risk 
information. This first result implies that the choice of when, how, and what to communicate affects price 
movements; however, rather than smoothing the variability of prices, disclosure actually contributes to it: 
one unit increase in the RDII is associated with 1.09% increase in volatility (see Column 1 in Table III). 
This also suggests that stock markets react negatively to voluntarily disclosed information on a 
company’s risk and risk management. More specifically, equity market participants react negatively to 
the disclosure of risk information of an insurance business, as it is, essentially, a complex system of risk 
management activities (i.e., the management of underwriting risk, credit risk, market risk, etc.). However, 
an alternative explanation of the effectiveness of risk disclosure practices could be that firms 
characterized by a high level of informativeness in their annual reports are associated with a high level of 
stock return volatility, due to informed trading. Indeed, financial markets react to higher disclosure levels 
through pricing that is frequently and accurately adjusted (according to theories on the link between the 
informativeness of public information and informed trading); in doing so, the dark side becomes a bright 
side. 
The set of control variables borrowed from the existing literature reports significant coefficients. 
MARKETCAP, as a market measure of insurers’ size, has a negative and significant coefficient, as 
expected: larger insurers have lower volatility than smaller insurers. Focusing on performance indicators, 
ROE and EARNING_PERSHARE have a negative and significant effect on stock return volatility.
b
 On the 
other hand, DIVIDEND_RATIO and BETA report non-significant coefficients. 
[Table III about here] 
The results in Columns 2 and 3 of Table III further deepen understanding of disclosure, testing 
whether the extent of disclosure is conditioned by the insurer’s end of year financials by introducing 
D_NETINCOME, a dummy variable that assumes a value equal to 1 when net income is higher than zero, 
and the interaction between RDII and D_NETINCOME. The results show that the effect of RDII on stock 
return volatility is driven by the sign of net income: a positive net income has a negative impact on stock 
return volatility; the interaction term has a negative and significant coefficient (the bright side of 
disclosure), while RDII confirms the positive and significant coefficient. This indicates that risk 
                                                             
b
 This indicates that the increase of net income over equity (ROE) and the increase of earnings over the number of shares 
(EARNING_PERSHARE) imply a reduction in the stock return volatility, as for non-financial companies. Consequently, the 
greater the gain related to the risks taken, the smaller the variability in stock prices. This also indicates that better performance 
is associated with lower volatility. 
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disclosure increases stock return volatility, but for insurers who present a good performance (net income 
higher than zero), risk disclosure mitigates stock return volatility. These results document the different 
impact of risk disclosure practices on stock return volatility depending on insurers’ performance, with 
beneficial effects from risk disclosure practices for insurers that present a positive performance (as in 
Kothari et al., 2009). 
The results reported in Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table III show the impact of risk disclosure on stock 
return volatility by introducing additional insurer-specific variables to improve the robustness of the 
empirical analysis. When controlling for insurer-specific characteristics, RDII maintains a positive and 
significant impact on stock return volatility.  
These results show that risk disclosure has a significant impact on stock return volatility, which 
becomes lower for insurers with a positive net income. For companies with positive financial results (i.e., 
insurers that perform well in a certain year), higher risk disclosure is beneficial for both insurers and their 
stakeholders. Enhanced disclosure enables investors to take the most appropriate decisions when they 
value their investments. For insurers themselves, it could help to limit the damage to their reputation and 
ensure the long-term health of the company (Deumes, 2008). 
On the one hand, if volatility is a measure of investor uncertainty and if disclosure reduces volatility in 
the case of positive performance, these results may indicate that more disclosure would reduce 
uncertainty in financial markets (as in Baumann and Nier, 2004). The findings confirm previous studies 
documenting a significant relationship between volatility and disclosure, and add to the existing literature 
by providing evidence concerning complex business sectors, such as insurance: in fact, disclosure 
amplifies the volatility while reduces it when an insurer has a positive net income. From the regulation 
perspective, incentives related to voluntary disclosure could strengthen the functioning of the market for 
corporate control (the more information disclosed, the easier it is to evaluate the firm). From a 
supervisory point of view, the effectiveness of disclosure could facilitate the homogeneity of supervisory 
mechanisms (i.e., the second pillar of Solvency II) and strengthen market discipline (i.e., the third pillar 
of Solvency II) (Eling, 2012). On the other hand, if volatility is a measure of more frequent and accurate 
pricing, disclosure increases market transparency, according to the theories of informed trading (i.e., the 
more information disclosed, the higher the stock return volatility, due to the pricing of information 
disclosed). 
To test the second research hypothesis (H2), this study further examines the relation between 
disclosure and volatility during the global financial crisis. As shown by previous literature, the “old news, 
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no news” paradigm is not the optimal behavior for an organization, while self-disclosure preserves its 
reputation (Claeys et al., 2016). Table IV introduces the D_CRISIS and RDII*D_CRISIS variables. The 
first variable (D_CRISIS) is a dummy variable that reflects the years characterized by the so-called 
financial tsunami (2008–2010), whereas the second variable (RDII*D_CRISIS) captures the effectiveness 
of risk disclosure on stock return volatility while controlling for the impact of financial crisis. If the level 
of risk information disclosed reflects the will of insurers to counteract the perverse effects of the financial 
crisis (n.b., the insurers played no role in the origination and the diffusion of the financial crisis), the 
addition of these two variables into the regression specifications should facilitate correct understanding of 
the real level of the effectiveness of disclosure. This approach enables simultaneous assessment of the 
direct and indirect effects of the financial crisis in order to detect the market discipline for insurers. 
[Table IV about here] 
From Table IV, the direct impact of RDII on stock return volatility, as shown by the coefficient of 
RDII, remains positive and significant, and the indirect impact of RDII, i.e., the impact moderated by the 
financial crisis (the coefficient of RDII*D_CRISIS) is positive and significant. This means that the 
relationship between risk disclosure and stock return volatility is not affected by financial crisis. 
Estimates for accounting, market, and insurer-specific variables confirm the results presented in the 
previous model. 
The results indicate that “when the waters are stormy”, insurers do not effectively use risk disclosure 
to reassure their stakeholders, or perhaps that the information content they provide is insufficient to 
reassure the market. This could be attributed to two main reasons: first, as shown in the earlier regressions, 
insurers use disclosure only as a mean to showcase a positive fina cial result; second, insurers do not 
really consider information voluntarily disclosed to be sufficient to reduce the heterogeneity of beliefs on 
firm value, especially during financial crisis, as they address information on risk management activities 
through other channels (e.g., actuarial reports). As such, insurers do not use disclosure in the most 
appropriate manner. On the other hand, higher stock return volatility following risk disclosure could 
suggest that risk disclosure is insufficient to reassure the market or that its content generates greater 
concern. 
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4.2 Risk disclosure and insurers’ embedded value 
Table V provides empirical evidence for the third research hypothesis (H3) focusing on a sample of 
insurance companies that provide voluntary information on embedded value over the period of analysis.  
The results show that RDII positively affects estimation of a company’s value (embedded value): the 
greater the disclosure of risk information (e.g., underwriting risk), the greater the value of the insurance 
business (the bright side of disclosure). This result should encourage insurers to disclose more on risks, as 
this information may be translated into more value as perceived by stakeholders and shareholders in 
primis.  
[Table V about here] 
Risk disclosure shows differential effects on stock return volatility, derived from stock prices, and on 
company value, derived from future cash flows. This difference may be related to the hypotheses 
underlying the models and, also, to the disclosure strategy pursued by insurers: more information implies 
less volatility (when net income is positive) and more value as perceived by the stakeholders. To the best 
of our knowledge, no papers provide an empirical investigation into the relationship between risk 
disclosure practices and this specification of discounted cash flow models applied to the insurance 
business.
c
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether risk information disclosed voluntarily plays a role in explaining stock return 
volatility and company value in the insurance sector. This analysis is motivated by the importance of risk 
information, especially for financial firms, considering that the lack of risk disclosure is considered one of 
the main reasons for financial crisis. For insurance businesses in particular, disclosure may be a useful 
tool to reassure stakeholders on insurers’ ability to manage the risks undertaken. Using multiple firm-
level data on European insurers, this research primarily finds risk disclosure to be a significant predictor 
of stock return volatility, supporting the literature that shows the dark side of disclosure; however, when 
insurers perform well in a given year, in terms of positive net income, the results show the bright side of 
disclosure. It seems that “more is good when all is good” and “less is more when all is bad”. It could also 
imply that disclosing more information leads to higher stock return volatility due to the informativeness 
of the information disclosed. Second, the financial crisis does not significantly affect the relationship 
                                                             
c
 All the above models are re-estimated with the dependent variable at time t+1 rather than t to counter for endogeneity issues; 
the results are robust under these alternative specifications. 
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between risk disclosure practices and stock return volatility because, “when the waters are stormy”, 
insurers do not effectively use risk disclosure to reassure their stakeholders, or perhaps the information 
content provided is not able to reassure the market. Third, the results show that information disclosed on 
risks contribute towards enhancing a company’s value, displaying a different effect of risk disclosure on 
volatility and firm value. 
The results from this study provide interesting implications for insurers and their stakeholders; in 
particular, they could drive insurers’ choices on communication and transparency, as well as regulators’ 
initiatives on market discipline. The results provide interesting evidence to insurance companies and their 
stakeholders, specifically regulators, policyholders, and financial markets. From the perspective of the 
insurance companies themselves, disclosure strategy can be adapted based on these results to ensure it is 
effective and used in the most appropriate manner, i.e., to reassure their stakeholders. From the 
stakeholders’ perspective, information on risks and risk management activities should be carefully 
analyzed. From the regulation perspective, incentives related to voluntary disclosure could strengthen the 
functioning of the market for corporate control. From a supervisory point of view, the effectiveness of 
disclosure could facilitate the homogeneity of supervisory mechanisms (the second pillar of Solvency II) 
and strengthen market discipline (the third pillar of Solvency II). Finally, from the point of view of the 
financial system as a whole, risk disclosure could be used to strengthen market discipline, and should be 
added to the other variables traditionally used to explain volatility and the value estimations in the 
insurance industry. 
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Table Ia. Variables description 
Variable Definition/Measurement Source 
RDII Risk disclosure index for insurers  See Appendix for details 
VOLATILITY Annualized standard deviation of daily stock 
price returns 
Stock prices from Bloomberg 
MARKETCAP Logarithm of total market capitalization, 
where market capitalization is calculated as 
shares outstanding multiplied by share price 
Bloomberg 
BETA Measure of volatility of stock price relative to 
the volatility in the market index 
Bloomberg 
ROE Ratio of net income to total equity Bloomberg 
DIVIDEND_RATIO Ratio of dividends to net income Bloomberg 
EARNINGS_PERSHARE Ratio of earnings to total common shares 
outstanding 
Bloomberg 
PREMIUM_GROWTH Change in total premiums from t to t+1, as 
percentage of premiums in t 
Premiums from Bloomberg 
LEVERAGE Ratio of technical provisions to total assets Technical provisions and total assets 
from Bloomberg 
EMBEDDED_VALUE Present value of all future shareholders’ cash 
flows from the covered in force business, 
capital and surplus taking into account a 
realistic hypothesis on the macroeconomic 
indicators. 
Bloomberg 
 
 
Table Ib. Descriptive statistics 
Variable N. Mean Median Min. Max. St.Dev. 
RDII 205 22.70 24.00 2.00 30.00 5.05 
VOLATILITY 205 0.35 0.29 0.13 0.91 0.17 
MARKETCAP 205 8.48 8.31 5.10 11.11 1.20 
BETA 205 11.29 0.94 -87.80 55.04 167.85 
ROE 205 0.13 0.12 -0.29 0.55 0.11 
DIVIDEND_RATIO 205 0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.21 0.18 
EARNINGS_PERSHARE 205 3.73 1.03 -23.64 31.44 6.94 
PREMIUM_GROWTH 199 0.06 0.04 -2.24 2.52 0.31 
LEVERAGE 199 0.71 0.75 0.13 0.95 0.16 
EMBEDDED_VALUE 99 12,196.95 9,683.00 1,169.58 40,476.00 9.735,05 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of accounting-based, market-based and disclosure variables for the sample 
European insurers. Variables are measured across each year t (2005-2010) for the insurer i. 
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Table II. Correlation matrix 
Variables  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
RDII (A) 1.000        
MARKETCAP (B) 0.415*** 1.000       
BETA (C) 0.003 -0.033       
ROE (D) -0.140** 0.071 -0.031 1.000     
DIVIDEND_RATIO (E) 0.071 -0.005 0.001 0.006 1.000    
EARNINGS_PERSHARE (F) 0.117* 0.222*** -0.032 0.152*** -0.007 1.000   
PREMIUM_GROWTH (G) -0.149** -0.076 0.006 0.160*** -0.042 -0.002 1.000  
LEVERAGE (H) 0.210*** 0.125** -0.022 -0.119** -0.081 0.122** -0.100* 1.000 
Notes: This table reports Pearson correlations among the variables used in the analysis. The sample consists of 47 European 
insurance companies and data are collected from 2005 to 2010. See Table Ia for variable definitions. *, **, *** denote 
significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
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Table III. Risk disclosure and stock return volatility 
Variable 
Equation 2  Equation 3 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
RDII 
0.0109 ***  
(0.0024) 
0.0105***  
(0.0023) 
0.0366***  
(0.0128) 
 0.0113***  
(0.0025) 
0.0102***  
(0.0024) 
0.0330**  
(0.0128) 
MARKETCAP 
-0.0460***  
(0.0110) 
-0.0411***  
(0.0105) 
-0.0401***  
(0.0101) 
 -0.0453***  
(0.0110) 
-0.0401***  
(0.0102) 
-0.0403***  
(0.0100) 
BETA 
-0.0001  
(0.0001) 
-0.0001  
(0.0001) 
-0.0001  
(0.0001) 
 -0.0001  
(0.0001) 
0.0000  
(0.0001) 
-0.0001  
(0.0001) 
ROE 
-0.5226***  
(0.1004) 
-0.3186***  
(0.1131) 
-0.3151***  
(0.1097) 
 -0.4788***  
(0.1052) 
-0.2353**  
(0.1174) 
-0.2402**  
(0.1158) 
DIVIDEND_RATIO 
-0.0237  
(0.0571) 
0.0000  
(0.0561) 
-0.0020  
(0.0558) 
 -0.0142  
(0.0592) 
0.0221  
(0.0582) 
0.0167  
(0.0580) 
EARNINGS_PERSHARE 
-0.0051***  
(0.0017) 
-0.0046***  
(0.0016) 
-0.0044***  
(0.0016) 
 -0.0051***  
(0.0017) 
-0.0045***  
(0.0016) 
-0.0044***  
(0.0016) 
D_NETINCOME 
 
-0.1606***  
(0.0482) 
0.5013  
(0.3214) 
 
 
-0.1744***  
(0.0483) 
0.4047  
(0.3215) 
RDII*D_NETINCOME 
  
-0.0270**  
(0.0129) 
 
 
 
-0.0236*  
(0.0129) 
PREMIUM_GROWTH    
 -0.1013***  
(0.0338) 
-0.1026***  
(0.0328) 
-0.0986***  
(0.0327) 
LEVERAGE    
 0.0155  
(0.0903) 
0.0396  
(0.0842) 
0.0376  
(0.0826) 
TYPE_INSURANCE    
 -0.0081  
(0.0286) 
-0.0178  
(0.0265) 
-0.0158  
(0.0260) 
Constant 
0.5792***  
(0.0945) 
0.6678***  
(0.0949) 
0.0175  
(0.3186) 
 0.5549***  
(0.1185) 
0.6523***  
(0.1138) 
0.0916  
(0.3261) 
        
Observations 205 205 205  199 199 199 
R-squared within 0.4190 0.3977 0.3975  0.4551 0.4287 0.4308 
R-squared between 0.1099 0.1493 0.1960  0.1491 0.2338 0.2690 
R-squared overall 0.2641 0.3093 0.3266  0.3048 0.3543 0.3664 
Notes: This table reports the results from the panel data random effect regression (Equations 2 and 3) on the relationship 
between risk disclosure and stock return volatility. The dependent variable is VOLATILITY. D_NETINCOME is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when insurer’s net income is positive, 0 otherwise. RDII*D_NETINCOME is obtained as interaction 
between the variables RDII and D_NETINCOME. TYPE_INSURANCE is a dummy variable equal to 1 when insurer’s 
prevalent activity is life, 0 when it is non-life. Variables are described in Table Ia. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
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Table IV. Risk disclosure, stock return volatility and financial crisis 
Variable 
Equation 4 
(1) (2) 
RDII 
0.0205* 
(0.0120) 
0.0195 
(0.0119) 
D_CRISIS 
-0.0677 
(0.1012) 
0.0196 
(0.1075) 
RDII*D_CRISIS 
0.0093** 
(0.0042) 
0.0060 
(0.0044) 
MARKETCAP 
-0.0183* 
(0.0098) 
-0.0207** 
(0.0097) 
BETA 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
ROE 
-0.1367 
(0.1016) 
-0.0365 
(0.1077) 
DIVIDEND_RATIO 
0.0019 
(0.0509) 
0.0023 
(0.0520) 
EARNINGS_PERSHARE 
-0.0037** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0036** 
(0.0014) 
D_NETINCOME 
0.3542 
(0.2931) 
0.3111 
(0.2891) 
RDII*D_NETINCOME 
-0.0207* 
(0.0117) 
-0.0194* 
(0.0116) 
PREMIUM_GROWTH 
-0.0964*** 
(0.0286) 
LEVERAGE 
0.0248 
(0.0752) 
TYPE_INSURANCE 
-0.0325 
(0.0238) 
Constant 
0.0927 
(0.2998) 
0.1352 
(0.3053) 
   
Observations 205 199 
R-squared within 0.5111 0.5458 
R-squared between 0.3234 0.4338 
R-squared overall 0.484 0.5292 
Notes: This table reports the results from the panel data random effect regression (Equation 4) on the relationship between risk 
disclosure and stock return volatility, controlling for the financial crisis. The dependent variable is VOLATILITY. D_CRISIS is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years 2008-2010, 0 for 2005-2007. RDII*D_CRISIS is obtained as interaction between the 
variables RDII and D_CRISIS. D_NETINCOME is a dummy variable equal to 1 when insurer’s net income is positive, 0 
otherwise. RDII*D_NETINCOME is obtained as interaction between the variables RDII and D_NETINCOME. 
TYPE_INSURANCE is a dummy variable equal to 1 when insurer’s prevalent activity is life, 0 when it is non-life. Variables 
are described in Table Ia. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% 
levels. 
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Table V. Risk disclosure and companies’ value 
Variable 
Equation 5 
(1) (2) 
RDII 
256.839** 
(111.243) 
274.883** 
(107.902) 
MARKETCAP 
4446.523*** 
(666.636) 
4533.623*** 
(659.460) 
BETA 
9.382 
(29.072) 
-23.524 
(30.395) 
PREMIUM_GROWTH 
-477.781 
(784.901) 
LEVERAGE 
15292.74*** 
(5148.499) 
TYPE_INSURANCE 
-699.978 
(1617.34) 
Constant 
-35372.67*** 
(7531.61) 
-48430.78*** 
(8707.591) 
   
Observations 100 100 
R-squared within 0.1585 0.2444 
R-squared between 0.7165 0.7063 
R-squared overall 0.6501 0.6473 
Notes: This table reports the results from the panel data random effect regression (Equation 5) on the relationship between risk 
disclosure and company’s value. The dependent variable is EMBEDDED_VALUE. TYPE_INSURANCE is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when insurer’s prevalent activity is life, 0 when it is non-life. Variables are described in Table Ia. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
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Appendix. Definition of Risk Disclosure Index for Insurers (RDII) 
We use 30 disclosure items relative to 7 risk areas to compose an aggregate risk disclosure score for the 
selected insurance companies. We follow the relevant literature (Malafronte et al., 2016) to compose the 
Risk Disclosure Index for Insurers (RDII), defined as follows: 
Area A – Risk management:   (1) List and definition of risks 
(2) Description of capital adequacy approach 
(3) Description of capital requirements 
(4) Description of risk management policies 
Area B – Underwriting risk:   (5) Definition of the risk 
(6) Description of risk mitigation activities 
(7) Quantification of risks 
(8) Description of stress tests and sensitivity analysis 
Area C – Market risk:    (9) Definition of the risk 
(10) Description of risk mitigation activities 
(11) Quantification of risks 
(12) Description of stress tests and sensitivity analysis 
Area D – Credit risk: (13) Definition of the risk 
(14) Description of risk mitigation activities 
(15) Quantification of risks 
(16) Description of stress tests and sensitivity analysis 
Area E – Operational risk: (17) Definition of the risk 
(18) Description of risk mitigation activities 
(19) Quantification of risks 
(20) Description of stress tests and sensitivity analysis 
Area F – Liquidity risk: (21) Definition of the risk 
(22) Description of risk mitigation activities 
(23) Quantification of risks 
(24) Description of stress tests and sensitivity analysis 
Area G – Other risks: (25) Identification of other risks 
(26) Quantification of other risks 
(27) Rating 
(28) Competitive environment/Market share 
(29) Historical results 
(30) Forward-looking data 
Each item takes a dummy value equal to one if it is disclosed, otherwise it takes a value of 0. Items 
numbered 3, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 29, take value equal to one if disclosed in a basic way, 2 if disclosed in 
an extensive way, 0 if not disclosed. 
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